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Edward D. Verrier on pp 38-40.I was probably 5 years old. In those days we played with
little adult direction. I preferred to run with older boys, and
my slightly older elders were teaching me the lessons of
marbles. I put my new bag of marbles in the ring, but one
of the older boys put in a single ‘‘cat eye’’ marble. ‘‘It is
worth 50 marbles,’’ he explained. So I learned the rules
and techniques for playing marbles. Later I had developed
both enough skill and the opportunity to knock the valuable
‘‘cat eye’’ out of the circle we had drawn in the dirt. When I
sought out a return of some of my marbles now owned by
others in exchange for the valuable ‘‘cat eye,’’ a nuance of
the game of marbles was revealed to me. The ‘‘cat eye,’’
now in my possession by the rules, was worth only a few
marbles. I never played marbles again with my friends.
Does this childrens’ game of marbles have lessons for the
adults’ game of medicine? The former is more simple and
transparent, which should allow us to expand that view to
the more complex problem of our debate.
There are basically 2 general ways to view this boys’
game of marbles. One is to focus on the game itself with
the rules, players, and performance. This might be the
way an adult would instruct the game, by teaching the rules,
techniques, and fair play. We might call this a ‘‘closed’’ or
teacher system, since we as the adult more or less know the
right answers to simple games like marbles or dice and can
instruct the boys as to right and wrong performance, infor-
mation, or ethics. I take the form of our debate to conceptu-
ally be a ‘‘closed’’ system.
An alternative approach would be not to focus on the
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The Journal of Thoracic and Cinteraction of the boys. In this view, the system is more
‘‘open’’ and the ‘‘game’’ played is self-organizing. This
bigger game is not about marbles or ethics per se but about
learning how to interact with games and people to reach the
ultimate goal. In this case, the ultimate goal is how to com-
pete for marbles. In this scenario, the rules to a game of mar-
bles are more malleable, and the strategies of the boys are
not restricted to the playing surface. Ideas of fairness or
ethics are likewise less restricted to specific categories of
behavior but are broad based or system dependent. Perfor-
mance and ethics are not clearly distinguishable. The
most straightforward approach may lose in the long run.
You may get more marbles playing many less predictable
games with a lesser opponent than one game of more certain
outcome. I argue the ‘‘open’’ systems are more representa-
tive of real life. After all, the Yankees always end up with
the best players, no?
Biologist Gregory Bateson1 quipped that ‘‘any school
boy ought to know’’ that the logic commonly used in linear
or closed systems leads to paradox in open systems. Ideas in
nature, biologic systems in Bateson’s cybernetic view, em-
anate from the whole, not from a particular part of a system,
even the ‘‘thinking parts.’’ Meaning is more than a sum of
the parts. Idea is superposed to the parts.
And paradox abounds in our medicine, as Bateson sug-
gested. I am not referring to the obvious things that we do
not know, but to the things we say that we do know. Ideas
that we are very sure, statistically speaking, are true. This
paradox is, at least in part, because we discuss open systems
with the logic or language of closed systems.2
Take for example our beloved risk-adjusted databases on
which we hope to base our most important policies and pun-
ishments. A peer-reviewed report found that coronary artery
bypass graft surgery in the decade of the 1990s demon-
strated that mortality declined in the face of climbing
risk.3 Not only do the authors believe this, but most of us be-
lieve we are operating on sicker patients without worsening
mortality. If this is so, what do we mean by risk in real pa-
tients? How does risk increase in the face of declining mor-
tality? What do we mean by risk? The self-congratulatory
explanation given was that we are doing a good job.
If we step back from this explanation as we did in the
marble game, we may have a more ‘‘open’’ view of what
is happening. The game is changing. Logically, mortality
should not go down while its risk goes up. Now it may be
that we do a better job, but we must remember this is a sys-
tem and other parts also play role. The explanation for both
the complexity of the patients and our decreasing surgicalardiovascular Surgery c Volume 145, Number 1 41
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price in the supply/demand curve is neither strictly a func-
tion of supply cost or consumer demand, our declining car-
diac mortality is not just that we do a better job. We
certainly cannot define risk in terms of patients by
looking merely at the mortality from patients selected for
procedures. If we do, risk will likely be paradoxical.
(We could, for example, have found that both risk and mor-
tality went up or both went down, but then this may not have
been directly related either.)
If we are to know the true causes of risk, we must know
the denominator(s). We must also study patient access, pa-
tients turned down, and patients offered and selecting other
modalities of therapy if we seek the real risk and benefits of
surgery. It may be that we have little to do with declining
mortality over the past few years. Certainly adding mitral
repairs, patent foramen ovale closures, or left ventricular as-
sist devices to various stages of coronary artery bypass
grafting do not help us decide what coronary bypass risk
is either by our databases. What is clear is that risk for cor-
onary artery bypass grafting cannot be understood strictly
from our patients selected any more than a stock’s perfor-
mance can be determined from the previous results.
In a related postprocedure analysis peer report, it has
been claimed that mortality is overestimated in the right
or high-risk side of our database risk curves.4 Ironically,
we are led to believe that low-risk mortality on this same
curve is more predictable and that we will soon come up
with better high-risk predictions. Again, this seems to be
a paradox of an open system confused by logic from a closed
perspective. If a particular population yields a particular to-
tal mortality, how can it be true that the high-risk side is
overestimated but the low-risk side is correct? Where
did the mortality go? There are no patients that die 1% or
10% of the time. Patients either die or they do not. We
are just not as good at prediction as we think at any point
of the curve. By what theory do we proclaim half of the in-
formation for a population correct and the other false?
Whatever we think of the death or survival of a patient based
from these database analyses starts with a bias.
Unfortunately, we have used our self-congratulatory pre-
dictability to justify high profile and high dollar research.
We select ‘‘inoperable’’ or high-risk patients for high-risk
trials. Although my argument is not that alternative therapy
including interventional techniques are not worth testing or
even that there is no such thing as risk, we must not use our
fixed notions of risk or predictability to either preclude real
world applications or demand excessive funding for defini-
tive research. Our paradoxical views of risk and competence
now demand nearly a billion dollars for successful testing of
novel drugs and devices. On the other hand, neochords
transformed both approaches to and surgeons available to
mitral valve repair after a few animal trials and master sur-
geon adoptions. It seems to me that the transapical aortic42 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgevalve implantation approach has much more the hallmarks
of a ‘‘closed’’ system and the neochords that of an ‘‘open’’
system. In the bigger picture, which was better use of our
resources?
The closed system mentality also leads to the paradox of
expert guidelines. By both process and design, guidelines
are developed by those that have pushed the envelope of
old guidelines. So we are espousing and regulating a closed
system by those who practice primarily in an open system.
The real question is whether we defend and support sur-
geons who mimic those experts that seek the new or super-
imposed logic of an open system or condemn surgeons to
follow the logic of the guidelines of a system closed behind
the free action of the experts. Will the real leaders stand up
and tell whom they wish surgeons to be?
Of course, there is the rub. The same surgeon who would
be the teacher in a closed system is the surgeon learner in an
open system. Although it might be reasonable to call this
a paradox, perhaps a choice may be more accurate. Either
way, the surgeon chooses his reality and results. He does
not ‘‘find’’ it projected into his results. This choice paradox
is more transparent in purpose, and where intent or reason is
posited in a system matters. It also likely is more robust in
its predictability inasmuch as the signal of appropriateness
is openly chosen and not hidden in the post hoc expert
opinion.5
I now come to the crux of my defense of the surgeon
who opts out of Medicare. We can see how medical
thought leaders have preferred the role of teacher in
a closed system to that of expert learner in an open system.
As one among peers, even expert learners in an open sys-
tem have no intrinsic distinction above other players on the
field. Experts as leaders play the same game as we all do in
open systems, even if they may as experts more often do it
better. In an open system, the teacher is at best an expert
learner. If there are prescribed areas of teaching, it may
be clearly defined. Closing the system to elevate some
peers to teacher subjects the rest of us to paradox of the
teacher-defined system.
The facts in this debate on Medicare are not in question
and are largely agreed to by both sides. The question is
how to view the facts. I argue the answer comes from the
way we ask the question. Those that answer for others close
the system, as do teachers with determinate answers.
Medicare as a payment system today is a massive transfer
of wealth from the poorest quintiles of our population to the
wealthiest. All agree to that. It is just that some want to
transfer more wealth to all age groups if this might be pos-
sible. Medicare’s age of 65 years and older is roughly both
the oldest and most wealthy quintile of our population.
The origin of the logic to this wealth transfer is more cir-
cuitous. Medicare was designed in a different era to provide
funding for medical care to those no longer employed. This
idea in turn was partially (and anachronistically) the resultry c January 2013
Acuff Point/Counterpointof our tax policy that shifted medical insurance and benefits
to an employer tax neutral expense and not to after-tax em-
ployee dollars. This small leverage in the past created a pres-
ently large imbalance inasmuch as Medicare has become its
own closed political game. Medicare thus arose as a way to
provide access to physicians to thosewithout the leverage of
employer insurance. Yet my debate opponent, now inured to
paradox, considers it mandatory that physicians accept
Medicare funding even if it leads to their insolvency. Medi-
care, which was designed to make mainstream physician
services available, is now destined to take physicians out
of the main stream. This sounds like a paradoxical position
to me. It also seems unreasonable and self-serving of those
who, at this point, seem immune to those consequences.
Medicare is now, or will soon be, economic nonsense.
Even some 5-year-old boys might recognize that truth.The Journal of Thoracic and CBut doctors are good at understating reality in their favor.
‘‘This may be a little uncomfortable,’’ we are fond of saying
about real pain. Patients have come to expect nothing less
from us. And nothing more. We must again expect more
from ourselves.
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